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This article is an intriguing and in depth going exegetical investigation of those parts of
Quine's philosophy which center around the idea of there being no fact of the matter
(NFM), thus especially of his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and of the special
form of physicalism endorsed by him. There is NFM with respect to a certain issue iﬀ
there is nothing on which a decision on this issue could be made; hence there is no acutal
matter to decide on that issue. This is what Taylor (p. 606) calls the core concept
of NFM. Examples are provided by borderline cases of vague predicates. Thus when,
e.g., Tom is a borderline case of baldness, there is no fact of the matter whether Tom is
bald (p. 606). Another example of (the core concept of) NFM cited by Taylor involves
counterfactual conditionals: if Obama had lost the elections, would have Biden stood to
the left or right of him during Obama's concession speech? Two possible explication of
the core concept of NFM are discussed in the ﬁrst section of Taylor's article. According
to the ﬁrst (semantic) one, there is NFM regarding X if our scentences about X lack
a truth-value. The second (ontological) explication diagnoses NFM regarding X in
exactly those cases where there are no facts (or objects, or properties, or some other kind
of entities) on which sentences concerning X could deal. Taylor explains that Quine,
given his basic philosophical tenets, cannot accept either of these explication. This
result is used in an argumentation occurring in a later part of Taylor's article; cf. the last
paragraph below.
In order to explain Quine's technical notion of NFM, some preparatory explanations
are provided in section 2 of the article. A theory type (p. 611) is a collection of all
the theories devoted to some special scientiﬁc topic. Thus, for example, physics and
chemistry, are theory types. In accordance with Quine's general philosophy, all the
theories of a type are assumed to be ﬁrst-order. Natural science is conceived as a certain
category of theory types. Chemistry and physics belong to this category; theories of
translation, however, do not though they make up an indispensible part of science. A
theory of translation for a given language contains a single predicate means the same
as and terms denoting expressions of that language. The theory's variables range over
the expressions of that language (p. 611).
According to Quine, there is a fundamental diﬀerence between theories of translations
and theories of natural science in that there is no NFM regarding the latter whereas
there is NFM as regards the ﬁrst. The second thesis that concerning translation is
called (T) by Taylor (p. 612), the ﬁrst one (S). Any adequate explication of Quine's
conception of NFM has to render (S) and (T) true. In section 5 of his article, Taylor
provides such an explication in two steps. First he deﬁnes a binary relation between
theories of the same type (p. 618): there is NFM between two theories T1 and T2 of type
T iﬀ, for any possible conﬁguration of the world at the level of elementary physics, either
both T1 and T2 are compatible with that conﬁguration or neither is. What is meant by
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the reference to the possible physical conﬁgurations of the world becomes clearer by the
following principle of physical equivalence. Let D be the set of physical particles and
{S1, . . . , Sn} the set of their basic states and relations. Then the theories T1 and T2 of type
T are physically equivalent iﬀ they are compatible with exactly the same distributions
of the items from {S1, . . . , Sn} over the elements of D. Hence, NFM between theories
amountsaccording to Quineprecisely to their physical equivalence. Now, using the
binary relation of NFM between theories, a higher-order predicate applying to types of
theories is deﬁned in a second step. There is NFM∗ regarding a theory type T iﬀ there are
incompatible theories T1 and T2 of type T such that (i) T1 is compatible with @, i.e., with
the actual world's distribution of the items from {S1, . . . , Sn} over the elements of D,
and (ii) there is NFM between T1 and T2. (One should be aware here that compatibility
between two theories and compatibility of a theory with a conﬁguration are two diﬀerent
relationships.) The two theses (T) and (S) setting apart translation from natural science
have now to be understood in terms of NFM∗: there is NFM∗ regarding translation (T∗);
and there is not NFM∗ regarding natural science (S∗).
In the last two sections (secs. 6 and 7) of his articles, Taylor points out two diﬃculties
of Quine's conception of NFM. In sec. 6 Taylor shows that Quine's arguments for the
indeterminacy of translation are not suﬃcient for establishing (T∗). Whataccording
to Taylor's analysisQuine's arguments concerning translation prove is the following
assertion (C): there are incompatible theories say T1 and T2of translation which
both are compatible with @. (T∗), however, is the assertion that there are incompatible
theories of translation T1 and T2 such that (i) T1 is compatible with @ and (ii) T1 and T2
are compatible with exactly the same distributions of the items from {S1, . . . , Sn} over
the elements of D. Obviously, (T∗) implies (C) but is not implied by it.
In the last section, Taylor argues that the Quinean conception of NFM is in signiﬁcant
tension (p. 629) with the particular version of physicalism endorsed by Quine. Taylor's
argument proceeds by two steps. In the ﬁrst of these steps, he shows that Quine's NFM∗
can be considered to be an explication of the informal core concept of NFM (cf. the
ﬁrst paragraph above) only if simultaneously some version of physicalism is accepted,
too. The reason for this is that exclusively physical facts are recognized by the deﬁnition
of NFM∗ as possibly decisive for the case of two incompatible theories. Now, the speciﬁc
version of physicalism which is adopted by Quine in his mature philosophy amounts to
the thesis that there cannot be any diﬀerence between two items if there are no matters
of fact in the world distinguishing them. Taylor (p. 632) provides the following more
explicit formulation of this principle: there is NFM between theories compatible with
the same distributions of physical states over elementary physical particles. But this
actually amounts to the deﬁnition of the NFM-relation between theories. Taylor's point
is that the explicative sentence just given cannot function as both a deﬁnition and an
assertion. Several possibilities to resolve the tension between physicalism and NFM
among them the option to fall back on a semantic or ontological explication of NFM
are ﬁnally considered by Taylor. All of them are shown by him to be not viable for Quine.
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